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Abstract 
Since its introduction in 1983, Value Added Tax (VAT) has played an increasingly 
important role as one of the major sources of revenue for the Indonesian government. In the 
last two and a half decades, however, there is declining trend in its collection performance as 
a percentage of Gross Domestic Product. This study aims to explore the determinants of this 
declining trend in VAT revenue using macroeconomic data. These determinants are 
decomposed into three broad categories: tax expenditure policy, taxpayers’ noncompliance, 
and the share of aggregate consumption in the economy. It finds that the performance of VAT 
collection could mainly be explained by tax expenditure policies and the extent of 
noncompliance with tax laws. It is proposed that avenues of approach for reform could be 
directed toward reducing the scope of VAT exemptions, establishing a systematic approach 
in data collection and analysis to closely monitor trends and changes in taxpayers’ behavior, 
simplifying the tax system by setting a single rate that is imposed on a single type of 
consumption tax, and improving audit effectiveness by building trust between tax authority 
and taxpayers. 
 
Keywords: Indonesia, Value Added Tax, Tax Expenditure, Tax Revenue, Tax 
Noncompliance 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although the name may suggest that VAT is a tax on value added, however, it is 
generally intended to be a tax on domestic consumption and is, supposedly, levied at all 
stages of production and distribution (Ebrill, Keen, Bodin, & Summers, 2001). As a tax on 
consumption (not on production or distribution activities), seller charges VAT on all of its 
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sales while be able to claim credit for the VAT that it has been charged on its inputs. 
Nowadays the VAT becomes a prominent feature in the tax systems throughout the world 
(James, 2015). Further, Gillis (1989b) argued that VAT implementation could be associated 
with successful revenue results from comprehensive tax reforms in less-developed countries. 
This widespread adoption may relate to the widely perceived (though often debatable) 
advantages of VAT (Ebrill et al., 2001; James, 2015). First, VAT could serve as an 
instrument to increase large amounts of revenue in a quick and relatively painless ways 
(Gillis, 1990). A study by Keen and Lockwood (2006) found that, all else equal, countries 
which adopt VAT tended to raise higher revenue than countries which did not adopt it. For 
Indonesia, significant increase in revenue could be observed after the adoption of VAT in 
1983. In 1987 revenue from VAT reached 4% of Indonesian Gross Domestic Product (GDP); 
it was nearly three times the revenue compared to the outdated sales tax it replaced. In fact, 
Indonesia’s tax reform of 1983 would be deemed a failure if not for the VAT’s revenue 
success at that time (Gillis, 1989a, 1990). 
Second, VAT is argued to be better for economic growth than other indirect tax 
systems due to its positive effect in encouraging savings, which could lead to increased 
investment and growth (Miki, 2011). The VAT – as a general consumption tax – does not 
levy tax on savings as well as on the interest from savings whereas, in comparison, income 
taxes are imposed on savings and on their interests. Furthermore, unlike income taxes, VAT 
is neutral to the choices of work or leisure. Under the progressive income tax system, higher 
tax rate – which will be imposed when people work harder and earn more – may adversely 
affect individual marginal incentives to work. Thus, relative to income taxes, VAT may have 
positive effects on economic growth since it does not distort capital accumulation and the 
supply of labor. 
Third, VAT is considered to be neutral to the market choices related to production and 
consumption (James, 2015). Since VAT is supposed to be shifted to consumers, it does not 
influence the forms or methods of doing business. Further, when VAT is imposed on a broad 
base, it would not affect consumers’ decisions on which products and services to buy. 
Moreover, when consistently levied on destination basis, the VAT would be neutral toward 
international trade. 
In Indonesia, VAT was introduced in 1983 as part of a comprehensive tax reform to 
replace the sales tax which was unproductive of revenue due to the complicated exemptions 
structure and the use of multiple rates (eight tax rates ranging from 1% to 20%)  (Gillis, 
1989a). Thus, for simplicity, the VAT was levied at a uniform rate of 10% on all taxable 
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transactions and initially adopted with no exemptions by product category. To maintain this 
uniform rate, a tax on the sale of luxury goods was introduced to improve the political 
acceptability of VAT at the single rate (Gillis, 1989a). However, the tax on luxury goods was 
levied on very limited items and consumption on these items was much too small as 
percentage of total consumption thus its proportion to revenue was generally, and still is, not 
significant. 
The Indonesian VAT was levied at national level and since its adoption VAT has been 
one of the major sources of revenue for the central government. Figure 1 shows that in pre-
Asian financial crisis period of 1990-1996, on average, revenue from VAT was 23.1% of 
total central government revenue. In the next period, 1997-2003, the number was down to 
20.2%. This decline may relate to the Asian financial crisis
1
 which severely hit Indonesia and 
adversely impacted economic performance. In 2004 the country’s situation was generally 
stable and the share of VAT in total government revenue was back to the pre-crisis level and 
for period 2004-2015 it reached 23.6%. 
 
 
Figure 1. VAT Revenue as Percentage of Total Revenues of the Central Government 
Source: Bank Indonesia (Various Years) 
 
Nevertheless, there is a downward trend in VAT revenue as percentage of GDP in 
1990-2015. Although the base for VAT imposition is not GDP but consumption (GDP 
basically reflects production, not consumption), however, the ratio of VAT to GDP may 
                                                          
1 For further discussion on the Asian financial crisis and its impacts on Indonesia economy see, for example, 
Hill (2000) and Aswicahyono, Bird, and Hill (2009). 
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provide a vivid first expression and assessment of the potential revenue gains from VAT. 
Data presented in Figure 2 show that in pre-crisis years, in period 1990-1996, yearly average 
VAT revenue reached 4.2% of GDP. In the crisis years, 1997-2003, VAT only garnered 
revenue at around 3.0% of GDP. As the economy recovered from the crisis revenue from 
VAT also improved. This increase in VAT revenue reflected Indonesia economic recovery 
which resembled a ‘V’ shape rebound (Aswicahyono et al., 2009, p. 354). However, in post-
crisis years the revenue collected from VAT has not been able to reach the same level as in 
pre-crisis years: in 2004-2015, on average, VAT could only provide revenue at around 3.8% 
of GDP.  
 
 
Figure 2. VAT Revenue as Percentage of GDP 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (Various Years); Central Board of Statistics (Various Years). 
 
 Moreover, data in Figure 2 reveal that as real GDP rose by 109% from 1990 to 2015 
the VAT to GDP ratio actually fell by 11%. As a rule of thumb, when GDP rises then VAT 
yield should also rise (Keen & Baunsgaard, 2005). A general consumption tax such as VAT 
should normally increase at least at the same growth rate as GDP; thus its GDP-elasticity 
should ideally equal to one (Bird & Gendron, 2006). In Indonesia, however, from 1990 to 
2015 the GDP-elasticity of VAT was only 0.78. This decline in VAT yield could serve as one 
of major sources of concern particularly at times when the government faces budgetary 
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pressures that stemmed from rising demands for expansions in public expenditures or the 
need to improve public infrastructures. 
 With these backgrounds, it might only natural to ask the possible causes of this 
decline. To answer the question, this study decomposes the possible determinants of VAT 
revenues into three variables: VAT gap due to noncompliance, VAT gap due to policy, and 
the share of aggregate consumption in GDP; as well as analyzes their empirical relationships. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In the tradition of public finance research, several factors have been identified as 
important for explaining the performance of tax collection. This paper presents a review on 
the available literature and discusses them according to three broad sets of factors: the degree 
to which the tax is administered, the structural features of the tax, and the scale of taxable 
activities. 
 
2.1. Tax Administration 
 It might be inevitable that the performance of tax collection depends on the 
effectiveness of tax authority in detecting, punishing, and deterring nonconformity to tax 
laws. Bird (2004) argued that even the best tax policy in the world would worth little if its 
implementation was far from effective. In this respect, the yield, incidence, and efficiency of 
a tax system may depend on how it is administered. Hence proposals on tax policy should not 
only involve the design of the tax code, but should also include considerations on the 
administrative structure to enforce it (McLaren, 2003). So important does the administrative 
aspects of tax administration that, in the words of Jantscher (1990, p. 179): “tax 
administration is tax policy”. 
 Recently there are efforts to collect comparative information about tax administrations 
in many countries. One of them is the study conducted by OECD (2013) which covered 52 
countries. One of the key findings in the study noted the wide ranging institutional and 
organizational reforms implemented in the effort to improve efficiency and effectiveness of 
revenue bodies. Other cross-country empirical study by Robinson and Slemrod (2012) 
concluded, among others, that the extent of tax administration and enforcement may partly 
explained differences in tax collection performance between countries. 
 In the context of collection efficiency, the administrative and compliance costs 
associated with collecting taxes are relevant factors in evaluating the performance of tax 
administration. Using OECD (2013) dataset, Alm and Duncan (2014) found that the 
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efficiency performance for OECD countries in collecting tax revenues was high. However, 
when data from developing countries are included into the calculations, this performance 
seemed to be less impressive. Overall Alm and Duncan (2014) suggested that countries in 
their study should be able to maintain their levels of revenue with 10% to 16% less inputs.  
 Martinez-Vazquez and Bird (2010) argued that political decisions on the 
determination of VAT base may considerably affect the potential revenue from VAT in any 
country. Further, how fully this potential base could actually be reached may affect the actual 
revenues collected. How close this potential base could be reached may in turns depend on 
the interaction between the level of tax compliance (or tax morale) and the effectiveness of 
the tax administration. Thus, Martinez-Vazquez and Bird (2010) suggested that the revenue 
productivity of VAT could be improved in two ways. First, strengthens the VAT structure 
through base-broadening measures; second, strengthens the VAT administration and 
compliance. 
Bird and Gendron (2006) studied VAT revenue declines in Ukraine and found that 
although real GDP rose by 49% from 1998 to 2004, the ratio of VAT to GDP actually fell by 
33%. They argued that this degradation in collection performance was due to deteriorations in 
the efficiency of VAT administration. As the country’s VAT administration was never very 
strong in the first place, as time has gone the growing private sector has increasingly 
exploited the inherent weaknesses in the tax administration. 
 Since the existence of tax evasion is likely to affect the performance of tax 
administration, brief overview of available literature on this subject might need to be 
discussed here. One of the pioneering studies on tax evasion is the work of Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) which provides theoretical framework on taxpayer’s decision in evading 
taxes. Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) provided an excellent review of the available 
literature on the factors affecting compliance, including the degree of influence of each 
factor. They classified these factors into several groups: audit probabilities; fines; tax rate; 
subjective tax knowledge and participation; attitudes towards taxes; personal, social, and 
national norms; and perceived fairness.  
Empirical studies on the effect of audit probabilities on improving compliance found 
weak cause and effect relations between the two (see, for example, in Fischer, Wartick, & 
Mark, 1992; Slemrod, Blumenthal, & Christian, 2001; Spicer & Thomas, 1982). Empirical 
studies on the impact of fines in improving compliance showed inconclusive results (for 
instance, see Friedland, 1982; Friedland, Maital, & Rutenberg, 1978; Park & Hyun, 2003). 
There were also mixed empirical results in studies on the impact of higher tax rates on 
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compliance (see Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 1992; Baldry, 1987; Park & Hyun, 2003). 
Increases in tax knowledge were found to have positive impact on compliance and higher 
degree of citizens’ influence on budgeting process could be associated with higher 
compliance (Clotfelter, 1983; Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001). Although many studies found 
weak relation between attitudes toward taxes and self-reported tax evasion (Orviska & 
Hudson, 2003; Trivedi, Shehata, & Mestelman, 2004), Kirchler et al. (2008) confidently 
predicted that the better the tax attitude, the higher would be the tax compliance. Literature 
on the relation between norms and tax compliance generally proposed that voluntary 
compliance would materialize if taxpayers’ norms favored tax compliance (Fjeldstad, 2004; 
Pommerehne & Frey, 1992; Wenzel, 2005). When taxpayers perceived that the tax system 
was fair then their trust in government would increase and this increased trust would boost 
voluntary tax compliance (Braithwaite, 2003b; De Juan, Lasheras, & Mayo, 1994; Wenzel & 
Thielmann, 2006). 
Further, Aizenman and Jinjarak (2008) studied the collection efficiency of the VAT 
taking into account the political and structural factors of the economy. They identified that 
countries with greater polarization and political instability tended to have lower tax collection 
performance; in other words, political economy considerations could affect the efficiency of 
tax collection. Further, structural factors (such as the level of urbanization, share of 
agriculture in economy, and degree of economic openness) were also found to have affected 
collection performance through their impact on the degree of difficulty to evade taxes. 
 
2.2. Tax Structure 
 One of the characteristics of a good structure in VAT system is that the tax is levied 
on a broad consumption base (James, 2015, p. 8). There are two reasons why a broad base for 
VAT may be advantageous (Bird & Gendron, 2007). First, a broad base could lower the 
efficiency cost of levying taxes since the rate required to achieve any revenue target would be 
lower because larger share of economic activities are covered in the tax net. Second, a 
broader base could simplify administration because there would be fewer avenues for evasion 
and the tax authority does not have to allocate its limited resources identifying different 
economic activities with different treatments. 
Nonetheless, VAT system of developing countries typically exempt a large share of 
economic activity for a variety of reasons (Mackenzie, 1991). When a commodity is exempt 
from VAT, no tax is payable on its sale and the input tax paid will not be able to be 
recovered. One of the reasons for exemption is that the output may be hard to tax due to 
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difficulties in identifying its appropriate output (e.g. financial services). Another reason is 
that exemption may be necessary for distributional concerns and political necessities (e.g. 
agricultural products and basic foodstuffs). Sensitivity in taxing particular items and 
conditions imposed by donors may also be offered as other reasons for exempting particular 
goods or services from VAT. 
One of the early attempts at examining the role of VAT structure in explaining the 
performance of VAT is the work of Bogetic and Hassan (1993). Their study focused on the 
impact of the complexity of tax system and width of tax base on collection efficiency based 
on a sample of 34 countries. They found that the more complex a tax system and the narrower 
a tax base, the lower would be its collection efficiency.  
Agha and Haughton (1996) analyzed cross-country data of 17 OECD members to 
determine factors affecting the performance of VAT collection. They constructed an index of 
compliance and regressed this index against several variables. Their study found, among 
others, that lower compliance could be associated with higher VAT rate. Further, the use of 
multiple rates was found to have adverse effects on compliance. They also found that 
compliance tended to improve when tax authority has longer experience in administering 
VAT and when greater spending was spent on enhancing the capacity of the tax 
administration. 
Jack (1996) examined VAT collection performance in five transition economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe by comparing revenues which would have been collected when 
there is no revenue leakage and the actual revenues. He argued that differences in revenue 
performance between countries in the sample were likely to be the result of VAT exemptions. 
Hence, regardless of the issues of evasion or administration effectiveness, when a country 
exempted some consumption from taxation then its collection performance may be lower 
than other country which did not exempt them. 
 
2.3. Scale of Taxable Activities 
Several studies have focused their attention on the impact of VAT (or taxes in 
general) on the behavioral patterns of consumption of economic agents; hence the direction 
of analyses is from taxes to consumption. For example, using an overlapping generation 
model Batina (1999) argued that when the taxation of bequest is switched from income tax to 
consumption tax, capital accumulation may be reduced. Seidman and Lewis (1999) argued 
that in a standard life-cycle growth model, converting income tax to consumption tax would, 
in the long run, always raise the steady-state capital/labor ratio, regardless of the elasticity of 
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saving. Using a two-class model with uneven distribution, Matsuzaki (2003) studied how 
consumption tax affected effective demand under economic stagnation and maintained that 
consumption would decrease effective demand when the ratio of poorer households to the 
total population was large. 
Further, several empirical research have examined the relation between consumption 
behavior and fiscal policy variables such as tax revenues, government spending, government 
transfers, and government net debt. This line of research can be found in, among others, 
Aschauer (1985); M. Feldstein (1982); M. S. Feldstein and Elmendorf (1987); Kormendi 
(1983).  
VAT is basically imposed on consumption hence the scale of consumption in a 
country’s economy may affect the collection performance of VAT. Several studies have 
explored the impact of economic growth and consumption on VAT collections; in other 
words, the direction of analyses is from consumption to VAT performance. For example, a 
study prepared on behalf of the International Tax Dialog (2005) noted that extreme variations 
in the revenue performance of VAT across countries may be attributed to a wide range of 
factors including differences in tax design, economic environment, and characteristics (e.g. 
literacy of the population). Cross-countries empirical study by Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) 
found that, generally, GDP growth had a positive correlation with revenue performance of 
VAT. In other words, when GDP grew VAT yield also rose. Similarly, Sancak, Xing, and 
Velloso (2010) found, based on cross-countries evidence, that changes in VAT revenue 
performance was driven by shifts in consumption patterns. Further, they also found that tax 
evasion tended to move at the opposite direction of the economy; i.e. when the economy 
expanded (contracted) tax evasion decreased (increased). 
 
3. Methodology and Data  
Before setting out the methodological aspects, however, it might be necessary to 
briefly review the concept of VAT gap which will be used repeatedly in later discussions in 
this study. VAT gap could be decomposed into compliance gap and policy gap. Compliance 
gap is defined as the difference between the amount of VAT that is payable as stipulated by 
the law and the amount of actual revenue. Hence it represents imperfect implementations of 
the law and could serve as a rough measure on how well it is enforced (Keen, 2013).  
Policy gap reflects the extent to which ‘tax expenditures’ (i.e. tax incentives and 
facilities provided by the government in the form of exemptions, zero-ratings and other 
reductions to the potential tax base) are embedded in the legal structure of the VAT (Hutton, 
10 
 
Thackray, & Wingender, 2014). In other words, it measures the difference between the 
revenue that would have been collected when the VAT was applied uniformly to all final 
consumption and the actual revenue collected amid exemptions, zero-ratings, and other 
reductions to the potential tax base. 
In this study, the performance of VAT revenue is to be driven by the effectiveness of 
the tax authority in administering VAT, structural features of the VAT, and the scale of 
taxable economic activities. VAT gap which arise due to noncompliance is used as a proxy 
for the effectiveness of tax authority in administering the VAT. The argument here is that the 
more effective a tax authority, the less would be the VAT gap due to noncompliance. This is 
because the tax administration would be more effective at detecting, punishing, and deterring 
evasions. Thus, a negative sign for the independent variable of VAT gap due noncompliance 
is expected in the regression result. 
VAT gap which arise due to policy is used as a proxy for the structural features of the 
VAT. Since exemptions and rate differentiations are highly likely to reduce VAT collection, 
the less exemptions and rate differentiations exist in the tax structure the higher would be the 
revenue collected. Thus, the regression result is expected to bring negative sign for the 
independent variable of VAT gap due to policy. 
Consumption is basically the base of VAT; hence, theoretically, the level of VAT 
performance should be proportional to the level of consumption. Other things being equal, 
when consumption increases then VAT revenue should also increase, vice versa. Thus, the 
independent variable of the level of consumption in the economy is used as a proxy for the 
scale of taxable activities and expected to possess positive sign. 
Hence, the model employed to decompose the factors affecting the performance of 
VAT revenue is as follows: 
 
            (1) 
 
where  ,  ,  , and   denote VAT revenue, VAT gap due to noncompliance, VAT gap due to 
policy, and the level of aggregate consumption respectively.   denotes time. All variables in 
Equation (1) are expressed as percentages of GDP. Further, considering data availability, all 
data in this study covers the period 1995-2014. 
 
3.1. VAT Revenue 
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Data on VAT revenue ( ) are collected from the central government’s financial 
reports.
2
 These data show the actual amount of annual revenues collected from VAT for 
period 1995-2014.
3
 
 
3.2. VAT Gap due to Noncompliance 
The methodology employed to estimate the VAT gap due to noncompliance ( ) 
follows Reckon (2009) and Barbone et al. (2013). Here, the gap is expressed as follows: 
 
           (2) 
  
where   denotes the VAT Total Theoretical Liability (VTTL) and reflects the VAT payable 
according to the tax law; assuming complete compliance on the part of taxpayers.  
 As a consumption tax, VAT is payable by end consumers when they buy taxable 
goods and services. Producers will pay VAT for the inputs they use in producing (and selling) 
non-taxable or exempt goods and services. Thus, VTTL is comprised of four components: 
(1) VAT Liability (VTL) from household consumption. This represents the VAT which is 
payable when households consume taxable goods and services. It is derived from the 
amount of consumption on individual goods and services times the VAT rate.
4
 
(2) VTL from unrecoverable intermediate consumption. This represents VAT paid by 
industries from purchases of intermediate goods and services (i.e. input VAT) which 
cannot be claimed because these industries’ sales – partially or wholly – are exempt from 
VAT. 
(3) VTL from unrecoverable inputs to Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF). This 
represents input VAT on GFCF activities which cannot be claimed by industries because 
their sales are exempt from VAT. 
(4) VTL from government consumption. This represents input VAT paid and cannot be 
claimed by government since government activities are tax exempt. 
Since exhaustive data on individual purchases made by consumers and producers is 
not available, national accounts aggregates are employed to arrive at estimates of VAT 
liabilities. Thus, the methodology used here can be categorized as ‘top-down approach’ 
                                                          
2
 http://www.bi.go.id/en/statistik/seki/terkini/keuangan-pemerintah/Contents/Default.aspx 
3
 Data in Rupiah and converted into U.S. Dollar using the exchange rates provided by the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). 
4
 VAT rate in Indonesia stays at 10% since the tax was introduced in 1983. 
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where figures from the national accounts are utilized to estimate the VAT liability accrued by 
different sectors in the economy. 
The data source on aggregate purchases of goods and services is the World Input-
Output Database (WIOD).
5
 WIOD classifies these input-output data into four broad 
categories: intermediate consumptions, final consumptions, investments and exports. While 
purchases for consumption and investment can generate VAT liabilities, exports do not 
generate such liabilities because they are subject to zero-rating. Data for period 1995-1999 
are from WIOD’s 2013 publication whereas for period 2000-2014 are using data from 
WIOD’s 2016 publication.  
VTL from household consumption
6
 and VTL from government consumption on 
taxable goods and services can directly be calculated since the amounts of these 
consumptions are stated in WIOD. These consumptions are multiplied by the VAT rate to 
arrive at estimations of VTL from household consumption and VTL from government 
consumption. 
The VTL from unrecoverable intermediate consumption is calculated by, firstly, 
determining the amount of output in each industry that is exempted from VAT. Once the 
values of these exempt outputs are determined, these values are then multiplied by the VAT 
rate to arrive at the VTL from unrecoverable intermediate consumption. To determine the 
amount of output for each industry that is exempted from VAT, a ‘propex’ factor for each 
industry is used (Reckon, 2009). There are changes in VAT regulations regarding exempted 
goods and services. Hence by examining these regulatory changes the propex factor for an 
industry in a particular year is set to zero if the regulations maintain that there is no 
exemption for all of the output produced by that industry – in other words, all of the 
intermediate consumption in that industry does not generate VAT liability. On the other hand, 
propex factor is set to one if all of an industry’s output is exempted from VAT – in other 
words, all of the intermediate consumption in that industry generates VAT liability. If an 
industry’s output only partially exempted from VAT, the propex factor is determined as the 
ratio of the value of exempt output to the total value of output produced by that industry. This 
requires the assumption that the proportion of intermediate inputs used in producing 
exempted goods or services is equal to the proportion of exempted output to total output. 
                                                          
5
 http://www.wiod.org/home 
6
 This category also includes consumption expenditure by Non-Profit Organization Serving Household 
(NPISH). 
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VTL from unrecoverable inputs to GFCF activities
7
 is calculated from the values of 
investment purchases in each industry times the VAT rate times the propex factor. WIOD, 
however, combines all GFCF activities from various industries under one heading; hence its 
value has to be allocated into each industry. This study allocates the value of GFCF to each 
industry by, firstly, determining the ratio of intermediate consumptions of all industry to total 
consumption. Once this ratio has been determined, the next step is allocating GFCF by 
multiplying the each industry’s intermediate consumption with this ratio. This involves an 
assumption that the share of intermediate inputs consumption is equal to the share capital 
expenditure. The method to determine the propex factor for each industry is the same as 
discussed previously in determining the propex factor for VTL from unrecoverable 
intermediate consumption. 
 
3.3. VAT Gap due to Policy 
VAT gap which arise from deliberate government tax expenditure policies is 
calculated as a residual and could be expressed as follows: 
 
               (3) 
 
where   denotes the VAT base and is calculated as the sum of total household, Non-Profit 
Organizations Serving Households (NPISH), and government final consumptions times the 
VAT rate. It basically represents the VAT which could be collected when the tax is imposed 
on a truly broad base, i.e. when the VAT is levied on all final consumption; under conditions 
of complete compliance and no exemption. Here, the VAT base left uncollected after 
deducting actual VAT revenue and revenue loss due to noncompliance is being regarded as 
the revenue loss arising from government policies to exempt certain consumptions from 
VAT. Data on household, NPISH, and government final consumptions are from WIOD. 
 
3.4. Aggregate Consumption 
Data on aggregate consumption are from WIOD and consist of the amounts of final 
consumption expenditures by households, NPISH, and government. 
 
4. Results and policy implications 
                                                          
7
 This category also includes VTL from Changes in Inventories and Valuables. 
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Table 1 presents the results from regressing the independent variables of VAT gap 
due to noncompliance, VAT gap due to policy, and aggregate consumption against the 
independent variable of VAT revenue.  
 
Table 1. Estimated regression coefficients 
 
Note: *** significant at 1% level. 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World Development Indicators (Various Years); 
World Input-Output Database (2013, 2016); own calculations. 
 
Regression results presented in Table 1 show a very high coefficient of determination 
for the model with all variables is significant and possesses the correct sign. The results show 
that the performance of VAT revenue is mostly affected by tax expenditures policy and 
noncompliance; changes in both of them explain 96% of changes in the VAT collected by the 
government. Changes in the ratio of VAT gap due to policy/GDP explain 49% of changes in 
the ratio of tax revenue/GDP. Moreover, one percentage point increase in this variable would 
lower the ratio of VAT revenue to GDP by one percentage point. Changes in the ratio of 
VAT gap due to noncompliance/GDP explain 47% of changes in VAT revenue performance. 
Further, one percentage point increase in this variable would translate into reduced ratio of 
VAT revenue to GDP by almost one percentage point. Changes in the ratio of aggregate 
consumption to GDP, however, only explain 4% of changes in the ratio of VAT revenue to 
GDP. These results may suggest that efforts to improve the collection performance of VAT 
could be directed toward reducing tax policies which exempt goods and services from VAT 
Dependent Variable: VAT Revenue (%  of GDP)
Independent Variables: Regression Statistics
VAT Gap due to Noncompliance (% of GDP) -0.988 ***
VAT Gap due to Policy (% of GDP) -1.032 ***
Consumption (% of GDP) 0.099 ***
Constant 0.048
Observations 20
R-squared 0.99
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and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the tax authority in detecting and deterring 
noncompliance.  
Quantitative research would usually expand this regression specification by adding 
several variables to, for example, test its robustness or decompose the primary independent 
variables further. However, this paper does not follow this tradition and leaves analyses on 
robustness or decompositions for further research. Instead, the regression results are followed 
by reviews of recent conditions related to independent variables which exert significant 
effects on revenue as well as policy proposals which could be considered in the effort to 
improve the performance of VAT collection. This approach is deemed crucial considering the 
decline in VAT revenue faced by the government. 
 
4.1. VAT gap due to policy 
Figure 4 reports the VAT gap due to policy as a percentage of GDP for period 1995-
2014. Over the study period, the annual average of the gap stood at 0.25% of GDP. Before 
the Asian financial crisis the trend in policy gap was declining with an annual average of 
0.45% of GDP for period 1995-1996. During the crisis the gap increased significantly. For 
period 1997-1999 the gap increased to 0.57% of GDP and at its peak in 1999 it stood at 
0.99% of GDP. In post-crisis period the VAT gap due to policy seems to be able to be 
brought down at an annual average of 0.19% of GDP for period 2000-2007. Nevertheless, a 
cause for concern is the increasing trend in the gap for period 2008-2014. In 2008 the gap 
was only at 0.02% of GDP but in 2014 it stood at 0.2% of GDP – it was an increase of 900%. 
Since major source for this gap may relate to the existence of VAT exemptions, 
limiting the extent of exemptions in the VAT system may be important because exemptions 
could result in complex and often adverse outcomes (Ebrill et al., 2001; International Tax 
Dialog, 2013):  
(1) Cascading effect could be introduced in the production and distribution chains.  
Improper design of tax policies could cause ‘cascading’: tax levied on items which 
have already been taxed – in other words it is a tax on tax. In the case of VAT, exemption 
would break the VAT chain since seller of an exempted item will not be able to claim the 
input taxes paid for the goods and services used in production process. Hence these taxes may 
have to be included in the sale price to cover the increased costs of production and in turn 
could cause increases in consumer prices. Further, when VAT exemption is granted at the 
final stage of distribution chain the value added at this stage will escape tax thus causing a 
loss of revenue. 
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Figure 4. VAT gap due to policy, 1995-2014 (% of GDP) 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World Development Indicators (Various Years); 
World Input-Output Database (2013, 2016); own calculations. 
 
(2) Exemption may distort production input choices.  
When an exempted item is used as input into production then the input tax paid on 
that item cannot be recovered and thus may have to be included in its price. This may induce 
producer to substitute away from that exempted intermediate input. This distortion may 
spread further to other economic sectors. For example, machine tool manufacturers’ decisions 
would be distorted by the exemption granted on the production of steel since they use steel 
products as an input. This distortion, however, would also affect the prices of tooled products 
due to the consequent impact of the exemption on the prices for machine tools. This impact 
on the prices of tooled products would further hamper the competitiveness of items and 
production processes that extensively use these tooled products as intermediate input. 
Further, exemption may make the structure of the VAT system opaque thus contradicting two 
of the basic principles of good taxation: transparency and simplicity (Keen, 2014). This is 
because the effective rates of VAT would significantly differ from its statutory rates in a 
fortuitous and nontransparent ways due to the vagaries of input-output relationships along the 
production and distribution chains. 
(3) VAT’s destination principle for internationally traded items would be compromised. 
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Destination principle in VAT system means that VAT is levied in the jurisdiction 
where the final sale of an item occurred. In other words, as a tax on domestic consumption 
VAT is imposed in the location of consumption. Based on this principle export activity is 
usually zero-rated. When an item is exempted, however, the consequences of the exempted 
input from earlier stages in the production chain would inevitably be incorporated into the 
exported item. For example, exemption of banking services from VAT means that the exports 
of firms that make use of banking services would indirectly bear the unrecovered input taxes 
paid by the banks. Further, a firm would have an incentive to substitute exempted domestic 
item for imported item. This is because included in the price of the exempted domestic item 
are taxes from previous production and distribution chains; whereas the imported item could 
be zero-rated (rather than exempted) in its origin country hence does not bear input taxes.  
(4) Exemption may encourage self-supply. 
Since exemption could introduce cascading effects in the production chain, producer 
of an exempted item would have the incentive to do vertical integration to be able to self-
supply the item in order to avoid incurring unrecoverable input VAT. As such, the distortion 
caused by exemption may have an adverse effect on economic efficiency. In the absence of 
exemption, a firm may refrain from self-supplying goods or services for reasons of, for 
example, economies of scale or the need for unique skills in producing intermediate inputs. 
The cascading effect introduced by exemption, however, may override these concerns and 
encourage firm to self-supply through vertical integration. This vertical integration may 
mitigate the problems associated with VAT exemption but firms may do so at the expense of 
economic efficiency. In other words, exemption may divert resources away from productive 
activity toward tax planning. 
(5) Complications for partially-exempt seller. 
When a trader sells both taxed and exempted items the recoverable portion of the 
amount input taxes that can be recovered is typically proportional to the value of taxed items 
in total sales. This arrangement, however, might increase the compliance costs that should be 
bore by the trader.  
(6) Exemption creep.  
When one particular item is exempted – aside from rising demands from producers of 
other items or other industries for similar facility – the government may also have to face 
increasing pressures for further exemptions in both upstream and downstream chains of 
production or distribution within that particular item. Hence it would feed on one another, 
creating a process of ‘exemption creep’. Exempting a particular item or industry from VAT 
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would encourage interest groups from the upstream chain to press the government to also 
exempt goods or services used as inputs for the exempted item. By the same token, when the 
exempted item is an intermediate product the downstream industries that use the item would 
have the incentive to lobby the government to also exempt their output. At its extreme, the 
cycle of regulatory capture arising from exemption creep could make the value added from a 
whole chain of production and distribution in an industry escapes VAT. 
At the start of tax reform 1983, the Indonesian VAT was designed to be levied at 
manufacturer-importer level. This was chosen considering the difficulties in administering 
the newly introduced VAT for hundreds of thousands of wholesale and retails firms at the 
time (Gillis, 1989b). Expansion of VAT to wholesalers was enacted in 1988 when the 
capability of the tax authority was deemed adequate in coping with increases in 
administrative burdens.  
The original law of 1983 (before partially amended in subsequent reforms
8
) basically 
imposed VAT on a broad base with all goods was taxable and exemption was limited for the 
delivery of services related only to education, social, religion, and health. By the reform of 
2009, however, the law expands the exemption to include no less than 60 items and groups of 
items. Moreover, besides the exemptions that are granted by the law, there are regulations 
which basically have the same effects as granting exemption on the imports and/or delivery 
of goods and services but are covered under different headings such as the VAT ‘borne by the 
government’, ‘treatment for special economic zone’, and ‘treatment for strategic goods and 
services’. Hence an item which is actually taxable under the VAT law might escape the tax if 
it was, for example, being classified as strategic good. 
Other form of VAT exemption may relate to the setting of threshold level of business 
size above which registration is compulsory (thus required to levy VAT on its outputs and 
entitled to recover the VAT paid on its inputs). In a hypothetical world where the costs of 
administering VAT borne by tax authority and the costs of complying with VAT law borne 
by taxpayers were zero there would be no need to set threshold; hence this would minimize 
distortions arising from different tax treatments while maximizing revenue. In the real world, 
however, there are trade-offs between administrative and compliance costs on one side and 
the need for revenue on the other side. Tax authority would be overwhelmed by the 
administrative tasks and taxpayers, especially small businesses, would incur excessive costs 
of compliance if the threshold was set too low. On the other hand, the basic objective of 
                                                          
8
 There are tax reforms in 1994, 2000, and 2008/2009. 
19 
 
raising revenue would be compromised if the threshold was set too high (Keen & Mintz, 
2004). 
In this respect, the recent setting of the threshold in Indonesia might be 
counterproductive for revenue generation.
9
 International best practice generally set the 
threshold relatively high during the introduction phase of VAT. This is due to the limited 
administrative capacity of the tax authority in implementing the new system (Ebrill et al., 
2001). In 1983 when the VAT was first introduced in Indonesia, the threshold was set at 
Rp60 million of annual turnover; it was 51 times the GDP per capita
10
 of that year. However, 
even after decades of implementation and experience gained by the tax authority, in 2013 the 
threshold was set significantly higher: at Rp4.8 billion or 126 times the GDP per capita. 
Although examination on the optimal threshold for compulsory registration is beyond the 
scope of this paper, this substantial increase may adversely affect the effectiveness of VAT in 
raising revenue for the government.  
It may be important for the tax authority to assess the magnitude of revenue loss from 
tax expenditure policies in a systematic and continuous basis since this would enable decision 
makers to have more complete information on the costs of tax exemptions. 
  
4.2. VAT Gap due to Noncompliance 
Basically, tax authority is entrusted with the responsibility to enforce the tax laws.. 
When tax authority lacks effectiveness and efficiency, the intended effects of tax policy on 
resources allocation, income redistribution, macroeconomic stability, and economic growth 
could be distorted (Tanzi & Pellechio, 1995). The performance of tax authority, however, 
depends on the myriad of private and public actions (and reactions), various environmental 
factors with their complex interactions, the details of substantive as well as procedural rules 
contained in tax laws, and the results of administrative efforts (Bird, 2004). 
Tax fraud and evasion are common in all types of taxes although, in theory, the 
invoice-and-credit design of VAT could reduce its exposure compared to other taxes (for 
further discussions on this issue see Agha and Haughton (1996); Barbone et al. (2013); 
Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006); Le (2003)). In practice, however, VAT can be fraudulently 
avoided and evaded in numerous ways such as by under-reporting sales, failing to register, 
failing to remit the collected tax, and falsifying tax credits or refunds (Smith & Keen, 2007). 
                                                          
9
 Argument for a high level of threshold typically points to reductions in administrative burden hence resources 
could be focused on small number of taxpayers with high revenue payoffs (see, for example, in James (2015, p. 
56)). 
10
 Data on GDP per capita are from World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 5 reports the VAT gap due to noncompliance as a percentage of GDP for 
period 1995-2014. The gap rose significantly during and immediately after the Asian 
financial crisis between 1997 and 1999. Afterward, there was a declining trend in 
noncompliance with the lowest level reached at 2.2% of GDP in 2013. Nonetheless, the 
picture would look less impressive when even this lowest level is put into perspective. In 
2013 the government revenue from VAT reached only 4% of GDP and with gap from 
noncompliance at 2.2% of GDP it would mean that more than one half of the revenue 
collected was lost due to noncompliance. Further, measured at 2013’s value of GDP, this 
amounts to around US$20 billion of lost revenue each year from noncompliance.  
 
 
Figure 5. VAT gap due to noncompliance, 1995-2014 (% of GDP) 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World Development Indicators (Various Years); 
World Input-Output Database (2013, 2016); own calculations. 
 
As in any form of tax, enforcement of VAT requires a plethora of administrative 
elements such as identifying those required to pay the tax, processing returns submitted by 
taxpayers, ensuring the accuracy of returns through audit, and imposing penalties for 
delinquent payers. These have to be accomplished under condition of limited resources 
available to tax authority (Jantscher, 1990). Hence, solid analytical foundation developed 
from sound information and intelligent analyses is needed for effective and efficient tax 
administration (Bird & Gendron, 2006). This is because in order to solve a problem, one must 
understand the problem in the first place and thus full and careful identification of the size 
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and nature of the problem is necessary. Indonesian tax authority (or every tax authority, to be 
precise) operates within limited budget. Hence, it needs to allocate its limited resources as 
effectively and efficiently as possible in order to get the most out of them.  
A more systematic approach in data collection and analysis would enable tax 
authority to closely monitor trends and changes in the behavior of taxpayers; hence 
administrative resources could be allocated efficiently and appropriate audit strategies could 
be developed effectively. In this respect, it may be necessary for the tax authority to break 
down the VAT gap due to noncompliance further by type of noncompliance (e.g., failure to 
register, data falsification, under-reporting of output tax, over-reporting of input tax, and 
failure to pay taxes due) as well as by economic sector (e.g., manufacturing, service, and 
trade) (Bird & Gendron, 2007). 
Other measure which could be considered simultaneously with improvement in tax 
administration is to change the regulations as this would reduce the breadth of the problem 
faced by tax authority in administering VAT. Poor regulatory design in key aspects of VAT 
could have significant adverse impacts on compliance. One of these key aspects is related to 
simplicity and in this respect setting a single rate that is imposed on a single type of 
consumption tax could be important. Complicating Indonesian VAT system is the use of 
deemed input tax for certain types of seller (for example sellers of used car, gold jewelry, and 
tobacco). Under the deemed input scheme, the amount of input tax that can be recovered is 
determined as a certain percentage of the corresponding output tax (not the actual input taxes 
paid) to arrive at an effective tax rate. The amount of tax due is thus calculated by 
multiplying this effective tax rate with the amount of sales. 
This is in essence a sales tax that is imposed at various rates depending on the types of 
business activities. Hence, in Indonesia, basically there are two systems of consumption taxes 
enacted in one jurisdiction. These rate and system differentiations may create scope for 
fraudulent misclassification, increase administrative and compliance costs, as well as distort 
allocation of resources between economic sectors. Moreover, imposing sales tax only for 
certain industries in a country where VAT is also imposed on other, broader economic sectors 
would break the chain of VAT in those industries imposed with the sales tax. This broken-
chain would cut the information from the VAT’s invoice-and-credit mechanism which 
supposedly flows to the tax authority thus adding to the complications in enforcing the law. 
In self-assessed taxes such as the VAT, audit may serve as the essential part of the tax 
system. Basic principles in tax audit are that it should be conducted both randomly and 
selectively while taking into consideration the risk profile of each type of taxpayer. Taxable 
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activities hidden within informal sector may also be detected and included in the tax net 
through audit activities. Indonesian tax authority generally have adopted some of the 
international best practices in its audit system and the role of international organizations such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could be essential for this development (see 
Brondolo, Silvani, Le Borgne, & Bosch, 2008). For example, for audit purposes the head 
office provides general guidelines on taxpayers’ risk profiles as well as provides a case 
selection system, sets requirements for auditors to meet certain qualifications, and establishes 
peer-review programs aimed at maintaining the quality of audits.  
However, the significant gap due to noncompliance as discussed previously shows the 
possibility that the problem may lie on the ineffectiveness of these audit programs in 
improving compliance. The possibility of the ineffectiveness of audits as deterrence tool has 
been studied by, for example, Erard (1992) and Mason and Kinsey (1996) who found that 
audits do not always result in improved compliance. Bergman and Nevarez (2006) found 
similar result and argued, under the framework of game theory, that audit may not be 
effective in deterring evasion in a society with wide noncompliance equilibrium (i.e. when 
cheating is the norm in society). Moreover, in the case of Indonesia, although international 
best practices in tax audit systems have been adopted their implementations are less than 
satisfactory. For example, although taxpayers can request that audit quality assurance teams 
be set up, tax offices may arbitrarily reject these requests. Hence, the quality of audits might 
be suboptimal and taxpayers’ trust in tax authority could be adversely affected. 
In this context, one of the possible avenues of approach in improving compliance may 
be to build trust in tax authority. Prior studies based on national and international surveys 
found that trust in tax authority was positively related to tax compliance (Kirchler, 2007; 
Torgler, 2003; Torgler & Schneider, 2005). For the case of Indonesia, surveys conducted by 
Deloitte (2014, 2017) found that arbitrary and biased tax assessments were still common. 
Respondents in the surveys also perceived that the tax authority lacks fairness, 
professionalism, proper business conduct, and respect for taxpayers in conducting its audits. 
Moreover, they expressed low confidence in tax authority’s ability in solving disputes in fair 
manners. This perception of unfairness might serve as fundamental barrier to compliance 
since citizens may be reluctant to pay their fair share of taxes when they do not believe that 
the tax authority is honest and that it has the capability in making sure that (almost) all other 
citizens paid their taxes fairly (Rothstein, 2000).  
A synergistic tax climate may arise when there is mutual trust between taxpayers and 
tax authority. In this climate the taxpayers trust that the tax authority is benevolent and works 
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for the benefits of the society hence they may voluntarily pay their fair share of taxes. On the 
other side, tax authority trusts that taxpayers are honest and thus delivers supportive and 
respectful treatments as well as provides transparent procedures for taxpayers. In contrast, 
widespread lack of trust between tax authority and taxpayers could result in antagonistic 
climate where an attitude of ‘cops and robber’ is dominant. Tax authority identifies taxpayers 
as ‘robbers’ with strong tendency toward evasion hence need to be constantly monitored. On 
the other hand, taxpayers think that evasion is the right thing to do since they feel being 
constantly persecuted by tax authority (which they see as ‘cops’) (Braithwaite, 2003a; 
Kirchler et al., 2008). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
The suboptimal collection performance of Indonesian VAT could mainly be attributed 
to revenue gap which arises from policy and noncompliance. In the policy aspect, a major 
cause for concern is that tax expenditures may have increased significantly in recent years 
hence scaling down the extent of exemptions could be important. In this respect, periodic 
assessments on the magnitude of revenue losses from tax expenditure policies may be 
necessary. In the aspect of noncompliance several avenues for reform are proposed: 
establishing a systematic approach in data collection and analysis to closely monitor trends 
and changes in taxpayers’ behavior, simplifying the tax system by setting a single rate that is 
imposed on a single type of consumption tax, and improving audit effectiveness by building 
trust between tax authority and taxpayers.  
This study does not explore the proximate causes of noncompliance and the detailed 
avenues of approach in managing trust between taxpayers and tax authority. Hence further 
research could be directed toward decomposing the extent of VAT noncompliance in 
Indonesia by types of evasion and by economic sectors as well as toward exploring policies 
aimed at creating optimum balance between the power possessed by tax authority and 
building taxpayers’ trust. 
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Appendix – A  
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World Development Indicators (Various Years); 
World Input-Output Database (2013, 2016); own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables (% of GDP) Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
VAT Revenue 2.535 4.468 3.659 0.453
VAT Gap due to Noncompliance 2.203 4.886 3.166 0.698
VAT Gap due to Policy 0.002 0.997 0.252 0.241
Aggregate Consumption 62.414 88.918 70.670 6.582
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Appendix – B  
 
CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES 
 
 
 REVENUE 
NONCOMPLIA
NCE POLICY 
CONSUMPTIO
N 
REVENUE Pearson Correlation 1 -.689
**
 -.535
*
 -.244 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .001 .015 .300 
N 20 20 20 20 
NONCOMPLIANCE Pearson Correlation -.689
**
 1 .686
**
 .841
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001  .001 .000 
N 20 20 20 20 
POLICY Pearson Correlation -.535
*
 .686
**
 1 .735
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .001  .000 
N 20 20 20 20 
CONSUMPTION Pearson Correlation -.244 .841
**
 .735
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .300 .000 .000  
N 20 20 20 20 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Sources: Bank Indonesia (Various Years); World Development Indicators (Various Years); 
World Input-Output Database (2013, 2016); own calculations. 
 
